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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
No 07-CV-3245 (JFB) (MLO)
Ch r is t ia n e  Mc Co w a n ,
Plaintiff,
VERSUS
HSBC Ba n k  USA, N.A.,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
February 12, 2010
Jo seph  F. B ia n c o , District Judge:
P la in t i f f  C h ris tia n e  M cC ow an 
(“McCowan” or “plaintiff’) brings this action 
alleging employment discrimination in 
violation of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 etseq. (“ADA”) and 
New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. 
Exec. Law §§ 296 et seq. (“NYSHRL”) 
against defendant HSBC Bank USA, N.A. 
(“HSBC” or “defendant”). Specifically, 
plaintiff alleges the following: (1) defendant 
discriminated against plaintiff by terminating 
her because of her actual disability, record of 
disability, and/or perceived disability -  
namely, depression; (2) defendant retaliated 
against plaintiff by terminating her for 
expressing her intention to file a formal 
complaint against her supervisor at work; and 
(3) defendant subjected plaintiff to a hostile 
work environment based upon her disability.
Defendant has moved for summary 
judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the 
defendant’s summary judgment motion is 
denied in part and granted in part. First, the 
Court concludes, after carefully reviewing the 
record in this case, viewing all facts in the 
light most favorable to plaintiff and drawing 
all reasonable inferences therefrom in 
plaintiff’ s favor, that disputed issues of 
material fact exist with respect to plaintiff’s 
claims of discrimination based on actual 
disability under the NYSHRL, record of 
disability under the ADA and NYSHRL, and 
perceived disability under the ADA and 
NYSHRL, claim of a hostile work 
environment based upon actual disability 
(under the NYSHRL) or perceived disability, 
and plaintiff’s claim that defendant retaliated 
against her for threatening to bring a formal 
complaint or lawsuit against her supervisor. 
Thus, those claims survive summary 
judgment.
AUTHENTICATED 
U.S. GOVERNMENT 
INFORMATION ^
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However, the Court concludes that 
plaintiff has not presented evidence sufficient 
to raise genuine issues of material fact 
regarding plaintiff’ s claim of discrimination 
based upon actual disability under the ADA. 
In particular, the undisputed evidence 
demonstrates that, at the time of the alleged 
adverse employment actions in 2006 (namely, 
her denial of a pay increase/ bonus and her 
termination), plaintiff was not suffering from 
a disability that substantially limited a major 
life activity because she was not experiencing 
any symptoms of depression at that time. 
Thus, summary judgment is warranted on the 
actual disability claim under the ADA.
I. Ba ck g r o u n d  
A. Facts
The following facts are taken from the 
parties’ depositions, declarations, exhibits and 
respective Local Rule 56.1 statements of 
facts.1 Upon consideration of a motion for 
summary judgment, the Court construes the 
facts in the light most favorable to the 
non-moving party. See Capobianco v. City o f 
N.Y., 422 F.3d 47, 50 n.1 (2d Cir. 2005). 
Thus, the Court shall construe the facts in 
favor of the plaintiff.
1. Plaintiff’ s Employment with HSBC
Plaintiff worked for defendant HSBC and 
its predecessor, Marine Midland Bank, from 
February 1982 until her termination on April 
11, 2006. (Def.’s 56.1 U 2.) For the last 
fifteen years of her employment with HSBC, 
plaintiff worked in HSBC’s Commercial
1 Where only one party’s 56.1 statement is cited, 
the fact is not contested by the other party or the 
other party has offered no evidence to controvert 
that fact.
Lending Department for the Long Island area 
as a Senior Commercial Support Specialist. 
(Id. U 3.) Prior to her termination, she held the 
position of Senior Commercial Support 
Specialist in the Relationship Support Unit 
(“RSU”). (Id. U 4.) In this position, plaintiff’ s 
responsibilities included providing clerical 
support for lending officers by processing 
loan documentation. (Id. U 5; Pl.’s 56.1 U 5.) 
Two other employees, Noel Tam and Pui Lau, 
were also employed in the RSU in the same 
position as plaintiff. (Def.’s 56.1 U 9.)
From 1999 until plaintiff’ s termination, 
Michelle Lin was the RSU Manager and 
plaintiff’ s direct supervisor. (Id. U 6.) Joanne 
Carboneri was also employed in the RSU as a 
Relationship Support Officer and was in 
charge of the RSU when Ms. Lin was absent. 
(Id. U 8.) During the same period of time, 
Philip Panarelli was the Senior Manager of 
HSBC’s Commercial Lending Group. (Id. U 
7.) He oversaw the RSU and was Ms. Lin’s 
direct supervisor. (Id.)
2. Plaintiff’ s Disability Leaves
In June 2000, plaintiff took a two-month 
disability leave from work due to depression. 
(Id. U 10.) In 2002, plaintiff took another two- 
month disability leave due to her depression. 
(Id. U 11.) Plaintiff returned to work 
thereafter and alleges that she did not 
experience symptoms o f depression 
immediately following her return. (Pl.’s 56.1 
U 12.) In January 2005, plaintiff took a third 
disability leave for depression. She returned 
to work in April 2005. (Def.’s 56.1 U 13.) 
Again, at the time of her return, plaintiff did 
not experience symptoms of depression. 
(Pl.’s 56.1 U 14.)
When plaintiff was on leave due to 
depression, she alleges that she was unable to
2
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leave her house, was unable to eat or sleep, 
and unable to “function” generally when 
experiencing symptoms of her disability. (Id. 
U 15; D e f’s 56.1 U 15.)
3. Plaintiff’ s Performance
As plaintiff’ s supervisor, Ms. Lin was 
responsible for evaluating plain tiff’s 
performance at HSBC. Ms. Lin rated plaintiff 
with an overall performance rating of “3,” or 
“Good,” on her 2003 evaluation but rated 
plaintiff as a “4,” or “Marginal,” rating for 
cooperation. (Def.’s 56.1 U 16; Declaration of 
Michelle Lin (hereinafter “Lin Dec.”) U 3.)
On January 30, 2004, Ms. Lin requested 
that plaintiff clean out a closet so that it could 
be used to store files. (Def.’s 56.1 U 17.) 
Defendant alleges that plaintiff “refused” to 
clean out the closet (id.), but plaintiff alleges 
that she told Ms. Lin she “was unable to” 
clean out the closet due to a severe dust 
allergy, which plaintiff claims to have 
discussed with Ms. Lin on several prior 
occasions. (Pl.’s 56.1 U 17; compare P l.’s
56.1 UU 17-18 with Def.’s 56.1 uU 17-18.) 
Plaintiff also alleges that Ms. Lin “never 
asked plaintiff’ s co-workers to clean closets.” 
(Id. U 18.) On February 5, 2004, plaintiff 
received a “Final Written Warning” from Ms. 
Lin during her employee interim job 
discussion, which appeared to be related to the 
dispute regarding Ms. Lin’s directive to clean 
out the closet. (Id. U 18.) The Final Written 
Warning also referenced a discussion that Ms. 
Lin had with plaintiff in September 2003, 
regarding plaintiff’ s conduct toward her 
coworkers and Ms. Lin. (Def.’s 56.1 U 19.) 
Plaintiff thereafter submitted a written 
response to the warning. (Id. U 20.)
According to plaintiff, on April 5, 2004, 
she received a second interim job discussion,
which indicated that her probation period due 
to the Final Written Warning ended effective 
April 5, 2004, that her performance had 
improved, that she had demonstrated 
teamwork on a daily basis, and that she was 
removed from the Final Written Warning. 
(Pl.’s 56.1 U 21.)
On plaintiff’s May 2005 evaluation for the 
2004 work year, Ms. Lin rated plaintiff with 
an overall performance rating of “3,” or 
“Good,” but rated her score for cooperation a 
“4,” or “Marginal.” (Def.’s 56.1 U 22.)
In July and September 2005, plaintiff and 
Ms. Lin had meetings regarding plaintiff’s 
lateness to work, the nature of which is 
disputed by the parties. (Def.’s 56.1 UU 23-25; 
Pl.’s 56.1 UU 23-25.) According to defendant, 
Ms. Lin told plaintiff that it was unacceptable 
to come to work late, but plaintiff continued 
to come to work late on occasion. (Def.’s
56.1 UU 23-24.) Defendant alleges that one 
incident involved plaintiff reporting to work 
twenty minutes late. (Id. U 25.) Plaintiff 
alleges that she was rarely late but, if  late, she 
would make up the time on her lunch break. 
(Pl.’s 56.1 UU 23-24.) Plaintiff alleges that 
Ms. Lin told plaintiff it was unacceptable to 
make up lost time due to lateness during her 
lunch break. Regarding the specific incident 
where plaintiff was twenty minutes late, 
plaintiff alleges that she arrived late to work 
one morning due to problems with a squirrel 
in her attic. (Id. U 24.) Plaintiff contends that 
she apologized and explained her tardiness to 
Joanne Carboneri, and Ms. Carboneri reported 
this incident to Ms. Lin. (Id. UU 24-25.) 
Plaintiff was subsequently reprimanded by 
Ms. Lin for the lateness. (Id.) According to 
defendant, plaintiff walked out of the 
September 2005 meeting regarding her 
consistent tardiness before it ended (Def.’s
56.1 U 26), but plaintiff alleges that she left
3
Case 2:07-cv-03245-JFB-MLO Document 46 Filed 02/12/10 Page 4 of 27 PagelD #:
<pageID>
the meeting “after Ms. Lin refused to speak 
with her privately.” (Pl.’s 56.1 ^ 26.)
Subsequently, on September 12, 2005, Ms. 
Lin gave plaintiff an interim job discussion, at 
which she told plaintiff that she had been 
reporting to work late and that she was 
required to report to work by 8:30 a.m. 
(Def.’s 56.1 ^ 27.) Defendant also asserts 
that, some time in 2005, plaintiff did not 
process a document in a timely manner. 
(Def.’s 56.1 ^ 28.) Plaintiff claims that she 
did not receive the document in the proper 
manner that she usually received time- 
sensitive documents but does not dispute that 
she did not process the document that day. 
(Pl.’s 56.1 ^ 28.) During the 2005 mid-year 
review, plaintiff told Ms. Lin that Ms. Lin was 
“twisting” her words, and plaintiff accused 
Ms. Lin of stabbing plaintiff in the back. 
(Def.’s 56.1 ^ 29.) Ms. Lin rated plaintiff 
with an overall performance rating of “4,” or 
“Marginal,” on plaintiff’ s 2005 evaluation, 
which plaintiff received in January 2006. 
(Def.’s 56.1 ^ 30.) Plaintiff submitted a 
written response to her 2005 evaluation. (Id.) 
Plaintiff asserts that her negative 2005 
evaluation resulted in her not receiving a pay 
increase or bonus for the year 2005, even 
though she had received a pay increase and 
bonus every year for at least the prior ten 
years. ((Pl.’s Ex. A, Aff. of Christiane 
McCowan (hereinafter “McCowan Aff.”) ^ 
18.)
Finally, defendant alleges that plaintiff 
was involved in at least one personal 
telephone call at work each day. (Def.’s 56.1 
^ 31.) Plaintiff disputes this and alleges that 
she generally did not make or receive personal 
phone calls at work after she was reprimanded 
by Ms. Lin for doing so on one occasion, 
when she was on a call with the District
Attorney’s Office regarding the investigation 
of her mother’s death. (Pl.’s 56.1 ^ 31.)
4. Plaintiff’ s Termination
In April 2006, Mr. Panarelli decided to 
transfer supervision of plaintiff from Ms. Lin 
to Ms. Carboneri. (Def.’s 56.1 ^ 32.) On 
April 11, 2006, Mr. Panarelli and Ms. Lin had 
a meeting with plaintiff in Mr. Panarelli’s 
office, in which Javier Evans, a member of the 
Human Resources Department, participated 
via telephone. (Def.’s 56.1 ^ 33.) During the 
conference, plaintiff was told that Ms. 
Carboneri would be her new supervisor. (Id. 
^ 34.) The defendant and plaintiff offer 
drastically different accounts regarding 
plaintiff’ s response to the notification that she 
would be reporting to Ms. Carboneri. 
According to defendant, upon being told that 
she would report to Ms. Carboneri, plaintiff 
“became upset, said that she refused to report 
to Ms. Carboneri and walked out of the room 
without being excused.” (Def.’s 56.1 ^ 35.) 
After plaintiff left the meeting, defendant 
alleges, Mr. Panarelli decided to terminate 
plaintiff for insubordination, and Mr. Evans 
informed plaintiff of her termination. (Id. ^  
36-37.)
Plaintiff alleges that when she was told 
she would be now reporting to Ms. Carboneri, 
she asked how reporting to Ms. Carboneri 
would be any different from reporting to Ms. 
Lin but received no reply. (Pl.’s 56.1 ^ 33.) 
Plaintiff claims that she was given no 
response to this inquiry, but was told by Mr. 
Panarelli to “think it over.” (Id.) At that 
point, plaintiff alleges that she was feeling ill 
so she went to the ladies room. She was 
thereafter called to Mr. Panarelli’s office to 
discuss the matter further with Mr. Panarelli, 
Ms. Lin, and Ms. Carboneri. Plaintiff alleges 
that she again felt nauseated, so she excused
4
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herself to the ladies room. (Id.) Plaintiff 
contends that when she returned, Ms. Lin and 
Ms. Carboneri were at their desks, so she 
returned to her desk. (Id.) At that point, she 
was called by Mr. Evans, who informed her 
that she was being terminated. (Id.) Plaintiff 
contends that Mr. Evans incorrectly believed 
that plaintiff had told Mr. Panarelli that she 
would not report to Ms. Carboneri. Plaintiff 
informed Mr. Evans that this was not true, and 
he said that he would call her back. (Id.) 
Plaintiff contends that Mr. Evans called her 
back to inform her that “Phil wants you out.” 
(Id.) Plaintiff alleges that she was not
terminated due to insubordination but rather 
that the decision to terminate her employment 
was made months before April 11, and was 
due to her disability. (Id. ^ 36.)
Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination 
with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission on September 22, 2006. (Def.’s
56.1 ^ 44.)
5. The Instant Complaint
Plaintiff brings several claims against 
defendant relating to her termination. 
Specifically, plaintiff alleges that she was 
discriminated against due to her disability -  
namely, depression. Plaintiff also alleges that 
she was retaliated against for filing complaints 
regarding the manner in which she was being 
treated. Lastly, plaintiff alleges that she was 
subjected to a hostile work environment at 
HSBC after her return from disability leave.
B. Procedural History
On August 6, 2007, plaintiff initiated the 
instant action. On June 12, 2009, defendant 
moved for summary judgment. Plaintiff filed 
her opposition papers on July 29, 2009, and 
defendant’s reply was filed on August 21,
2009. Oral argument was held on September 
24, 2009. This matter is fully submitted.
II. Sta n d a r d  of Re v ie w
The standards for summary judgment are 
well settled. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56(c), a court may not grant a 
motion for summary judgment unless “the 
p lead ings, depositions, answ ers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with affidavits, if  any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(c); Globecon Group, LLC v. HartfordFire 
Ins. Co., 434 F.3d 165, 170 (2d Cir. 2006). 
The moving party bears the burden of 
showing that he or she is entitled to summary 
judgment. See Huminski v. Corsones, 396 
F.3d 53, 69 (2d Cir. 2005). The court “is not 
to weigh the evidence but is instead required 
to view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the party opposing summary 
judgment, to draw all reasonable inferences in 
favor of that party, and to eschew credibility 
assessments.” Amnesty Am. v. Town o f W. 
Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 122 (2d Cir. 2004); 
see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 
242, 248 (1986) (summary judgment is 
unwarranted if “the evidence is such that a 
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 
nonmoving party”).
Once the moving party has met its burden, 
the opposing party “‘must do more than 
simply show that there is some metaphysical 
doubt as to the material facts . . . . [T]he 
nonmoving party must come forward with 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine 
issue for trial.’” Caldarola v. Calabrese, 298 
F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting 
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio 
Corp, 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986) (emphasis
5
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in original)). As the Supreme Court stated in 
Anderson, “[i]f the evidence is merely 
colorable, or is not significantly probative, 
summary judgment may be granted.” 
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (citations 
omitted). Indeed, “the mere existence of some 
alleged factual dispute between the parties” 
alone will not defeat a properly supported 
motion for summary judgment. Id. at 247-48 
(emphasis in original). Thus, the nonmoving 
party may not rest upon mere conclusory 
allegations or denials but must set forth 
“‘concrete particulars’” showing that a trial is 
needed. R.G. Group, Inc. v. Horn & Hardart 
Co., 751 F.2d 69, 77 (2d Cir. 1984) (quoting 
SEC v. Research Automation Corp., 585 F.2d 
31, 33 (2d Cir. 1978)). Accordingly, it is 
insufficient for a party opposing summary 
judgment “‘merely to assert a conclusion 
without supplying supporting arguments or 
facts.’” BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. W.R. 
Grace & Co., 77 F.3d 603, 615 (2 d Cir. 1996) 
(quoting Research Automation Corp., 585 
F.2d at 33).
The Second Circuit has provided 
additional guidance regarding summary 
judgment motions in discrimination cases:
We have sometimes noted that 
an extra measure of caution is 
merited in affirming summary 
judgment in a discrimination 
action because direct evidence 
of discriminatory intent is rare 
and such intent often must be 
inferred from circumstantial 
evidence found in affidavits 
and depositions. See, e.g.,
G a l l o  v. P r u d e n t i a l  
Residential Servs., 22 F.3d 
1219, 1224 (2d Cir. 1994). 
N o n e th e le ss , “ sum m ary 
judgment remains available
fo r th e  d is m is sa l  o f  
discrimination claims in cases 
lacking genuine issues of 
material fact.” McLee v. 
Chrysler Corp., 109 F.3d 130,
135 (2d Cir. 1997); see also 
Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air 
Lines, Inc., 239 F.3d 456, 466 
(2d Cir. 2001) (“It is now 
beyond cavil that summary 
judgment may be appropriate 
even in the fact-intensive 
context of discrimination 
cases.”).
Schiano v. Quality Payroll Sys., 445 F.3d 597, 
603 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Holtz v. 
Rockefeller & Co., 258 F.3d 62, 69 (2d Cir. 
2001)).
III. D isc u ssio n
A. The Americans with Disabilities Act
The ADA provides that “[n]o covered 
entity shall discriminate against a qualified 
individual with a disability because of the 
disability of such individual in regard to job 
app lication  procedures, the hiring, 
advancement, or discharge of employees, 
employee compensation, job training, and 
other terms, conditions, and privileges of 
employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The 
ADA defines “disability” as:
(A) a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially 
limits one or more of the 
major life activities of such 
individual;2
2 As discussed further infra, New York Human 
Rights Law defines disability more broadly than 
the ADA.
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(B) a record of such an 
impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having 
such an impairment.
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). To establish a prima 
facie case of discrimination under the ADA or 
New York Human Rights Law,3 an employee 
has the burden to demonstrate that: (i) the 
employer is covered by the statute and had 
notice of her disability; (ii) she was an 
individual who was disabled within the 
meaning of the statute; (iii) plaintiff was 
otherwise qualified to perform the essential 
functions of the job with or without 
reasonable accommodation; and (iv) she was 
subject to an adverse employment action as a 
result of her disability. See Ryan v. Grae & 
Rybicki, P.C., 135 F.3d 867, 869-70 (2d Cir. 
1998).
Congress recently enacted the ADA 
Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”), 
effective January 1,2009, which expanded the 
class of individuals entitled to protection 
under the ADA. As the Ninth Circuit has 
explained:
In the ADAAA, Congress 
emphasizes that when it 
enacted the ADA in 1990, it
3 A claim of disability discrimination under the 
New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. 
Law §§ 290-301 (McKinneys 2005), is governed 
by the same legal standards that govern federal 
ADA claims. Parker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 
204 F.3d 326, 332 n.1 (2d Cir. 2000). Thus, to the 
extent that plaintiff brings state-law 
disability-discrimination claims, those would 
survive or fail on the same basis as her ADA 
claims, except where otherwise noted in this 
opinion.
“intended that the Act ‘provide 
a clear and comprehensive 
national mandate for the 
elimination of discrimination 
against individuals with 
disabilities’ and provide broad 
coverage.” The ADAAA 
rejects the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the term 
“disability” in Sutton v. United 
Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471,
119 S. Ct. 2139, 144 L. Ed. 2d 
450 (1999), and Toyota Motor 
Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. 
v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 122 
S. Ct. 681, 151 L. Ed. 2d 615 
(2002), and thereby expands 
the class of individuals who 
are entitled to protection under 
the ADA.
Rohr v. Salt River Project Agric. Imp. and 
Power Dist., 555 F.3d 850, 853 (9th Cir. 
2009) (citations omitted). However, this 
Court and other courts have stated that the 
ADAAA does not apply to conduct that 
occurred prior to the effective date of the 
statute. See, e.g., Schroeder v. Suffolk County 
Cmty. College, No. 07-CV-2060 (JFB) 
(WDW), 2009 WL 1748869, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. 
June 22, 2009) (collecting cases); see also 
Cody v. County o f Nassau, No. 08-5127-cv, 
2009 WL 2958742, at *3 (2d Cir. Sept. 16, 
2009) (summary order) (“[I]t is unlikely that 
the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 . . . 
applies to conduct that occurred before the 
Act’s effective date of January 1, 2009. We 
need not decide the retroactivity issue . . . .”); 
White v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 07 Civ. 
4286 (NGG) (MDG), 2009 WL 1140434, at 
*5 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2009) (“The court 
therefore . . . concludes that the [ADAAA] 
should not apply to this case. This is 
consistent with the conclusions of other courts
7
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in this circuit that the 2008 Amendments do 
not apply to conduct prior to the effective date 
of the amended statute.”) (collecting cases); 
Moran v. Premier Educ. Group, LP, 599 F. 
Supp. 2d 263, 271-72 (D. Conn. 2009) (“[I]t 
appears that every court that has addressed 
this issue, which includes a number of federal 
district courts and at least one federal appeals 
court, has concluded that the 2008 
Amendments cannot be applied retroactively 
to conduct that preceded its effective date.”) 
(collecting cases). Thus, the Court must 
evaluate plaintiff’ s evidence within the legal 
framework in place at the time of the alleged 
behavior, which is 2005-2006.
1. Prima Facie Case
a. Employer Coverage and Notice under the 
ADA
As a private employer with more than 
fifteen employees, defendant HSBC does not 
contest that it is subject to the ADA. See 42 
U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A). Defendant also does 
not contest that it had notice of plaintiff’ s 
alleged disability. Plaintiff’ s disability had 
required her to take several extended leaves of 
absence from work, and she reported that 
disability to her supervisors at HSBC. (Pl.’s 
Ex. D, Deposition of Michelle Lin (hereinafter 
“Lin D ep ”), at 15:6-9; see Pl.’s Ex. C, 
D eposition o f C hristiane M cCowan 
(hereinafter “McCowan Dep.”) at 118:17-24.)
b. Disability Claim
(i) Actual Disability4 
(1) Disability Claim under the ADA
“In determining whether an individual has 
a disability for purposes of the ADA and 
Section 504 [of the Rehabilitation Act], we 
have applied the three-step approach taken by 
the Supreme Court in Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 
U.S. 624, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 141 L. Ed. 2d 540 
(1998).” Weixel v. Board o f Educ. o f City o f 
New York, 287 F.3d 138, 147 (2d Cir. 2002). 
The Second Circuit has elaborated:
Under the [Colwell v. Suffolk 
County Police D ep’t, 158 F.3d 
635, 641 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(adopting Bragdon)] analysis, 
plaintiff must first show that 
she suffers from a physical or 
mental impairment. Second, 
plaintiff must identify the 
activity claimed to be impaired 
and establish that it constitutes 
a “major life activity.” Third, 
the plaintiff must show that 
her impairment “substantially 
limits” the major life activity 
previously identified. In 
addition, the Supreme Court 
has recently clarified that the 
identified major life activity 
must be “of central importance 
to daily life.” Toyota Motor 
Mfg. v. Williams, 534 U.S.
4 For ease of reference, the Court refers to a 
“physical or mental impairment that substantially 
limits one or more of the major life activities of 
such individual” under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) 
as an “actual disability.”
8
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184, 122 S. Ct. 681, 691, 151 
L. Ed. 2d 615 (2002).
Id. (additional citations omitted). Major life 
activities include “functions such as caring for 
oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, 
seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, 
and working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(I). An 
impairment substantially limits a major life 
activity other than work if it prevents an 
individual from performing an activity that the 
average person in the general population can 
perform, or if  it significantly restricts the 
duration, manner, or condition under which an 
individual can perform the activity as 
compared to the ability of the average person 
in the general population. See 29 C.F.R. § 
1630.2(j)(1). Courts may consider the 
following factors in this analysis: (1) the 
nature and severity of the impairment; (2) the 
duration or expected duration of the 
impairment; and (3) the permanent or 
long-term impact, or the expected permanent 
or long-term impact of or resulting from the 
impairment. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2).
The determination as to whether or not 
plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the 
statute requires “an individualized, 
fact-specific analysis.” Worthington v. City o f 
New Haven, No. 3:94 Civ. 00609 (EBB), 1999 
WL 958627, at *8 (D. Conn. Oct. 5, 1999) 
(citations omitted). To prove disability under 
this test, an individual must do more than 
“merely submit evidence of a medical 
diagnosis of an impairment.” Toyota Motor 
Mfg. v. Williams, 534 U S. 184, 197 (2002). 
Instead, “the ADA requires those ‘claiming 
the Act’s protection . . . to prove a disability 
by offering evidence that the extent of the 
limitation [caused by the impairment] in terms 
of their own experience . . . is substantial.’” 
Toyota, 534 U.S. at 198 (quoting Albertson’s
Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 567 
(1999)).
In order for plaintiff to fall within the 
protections of the ADA under a claim of 
actual disability, she bears the burden of 
demonstrating that she has a “physical or 
mental impairment that substantially limits 
one or more [of her] major life activities.” 42 
U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). Under Colwell, 
plaintiff must first show that she suffers from 
a physical or mental impairment. In this case, 
plaintiff has presented evidence that she 
suffers from depression. Depression may 
qualify as a mental impairment under the 
ADA. See, e.g., Menes v. City Univ. o f N.Y., 
92 F. Supp. 2d 294, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), 
overruled on other grounds by Harris v. Mills, 
572 F.3d 66, 73 (2d Cir. 2009). Plaintiff 
argues that she had a disability at the time of 
her discharge in April 2006. Plaintiff 
submitted evidence that she had been 
diagnosed with Major Depressive Disorder. 
(Pl.’s Ex. B ^ 4; Pl.’s Ex. BB.)
Under the ADA, a mental impairment 
does not rise to the level of a “disability” 
unless such impairment “substantially limits” 
a major life activity. Thus, plaintiff must 
identify the activity or activities claimed to be 
impaired and establish that it constitutes a 
“major life activity.” In addition, the plaintiff 
must show that his impairment “substantially 
limits” that major life activity. Plaintiff 
asserts that her depression rendered her 
substantially limited in the major life activities 
of “eating, sleeping, working, and functioning 
in her life during depressive episodes.” (Pl.’s 
Opp. at 10 (citing Ex. B ^  7, 9-10, 12; Ex. C 
at 35-36).)
Although plaintiff contends that the 
evidence demonstrates that she had an actual 
disability, an individual does not have an
9
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actual disability under the ADA unless she is 
disabled at the time of the adverse 
employment action: “ [a]n action for
employment discrimination brought pursuant 
to the . . . ADA, is properly resolved by 
granting summary judgment to the defendant 
employer where the plaintiff was not a 
handicapped or disabled person within the 
meaning of the acts at the time of the adverse 
employment decision.” Joyce v. Suffolk 
County, 911 F. Supp. 92, 98 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). 
Here, based upon the undisputed facts, 
plaintiff cannot demonstrate that she suffered 
from a disability at the time of the alleged 
adverse employment decisions. According to 
plaintiff’ s own testimony, she “was not 
experiencing symptoms of depression 
immediately following her return to work in 
2002” and “was not experiencing symptoms 
of depression immediately following her 
return to work in 2005.” (Pl.’s 56.1 ^  12, 
14.) Plaintiff also stated at her deposition that 
she was not depressed when she returned to 
work after her leaves in 2002 and 2005:
Q: When you returned to work in 2002 
from Disability leave, were you still 
depressed?
A: No.
Q: When you returned from leave in 
or about April 2005, from Disability 
leave, were you still depressed?
A: When I returned?
Q: Yes.
A: No.
(Def.’s Ex. M, McCowan Dep. at 35:9-18.) 
Plaintiff has not presented evidence that her 
symptoms of depression returned at any point 
after she resumed work in April 2005 until her
termination in April 2006. Therefore, the 
undisputed evidence demonstrates that 
plaintiff is unable to claim relief under the 
ADA on the basis of discrimination due to an 
actual disability at the time of the alleged 
adverse employment actions. See Heilweil v. 
Mount Sinai Hosp., 32 F.3d 718, 726 (2d Cir. 
1994) (affirming dismissal of plaintiff’ s claim 
because “at the time the adverse employment 
decision was made [plaintiff] was not a 
handicapped person under the Act”); 
Campbell v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 
03CV1421(KMK)(HBP), 2006 WL 839001, 
at *5 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2006) (“Plaintiff 
has not provided any evidence that she had, at 
the relevant time, an impairment which 
substantially limited one or more life activities 
or that Defendant regarded her as having such 
an impairment. Therefore, Plaintiff has not 
substantiated a putative claim that she was 
disabled under the ADA . . . .”) (emphasis 
added); Picinich v. United Parcel Serv., 321 
F. Supp. 2d 485, 500 (N.D.N.Y. 2004) (“[T]he 
court’ s focus must be on whether [plaintiff] 
was disabled ‘at the time the adverse action 
occurred.’” (quoting Monroe v. Cortland 
County, N.Y., 37 F. Supp. 2d 546, 553 
(N.D.N.Y. 1999))).
The Court thus concludes, after careful 
consideration of the record in this case, that 
there are no disputed issues of material fact as 
to whether plaintiff was, at the time of the 
adverse employment action, substantially 
limited in the major life activities of eating, 
sleeping, working, or generally functioning in 
her life. Thus, plaintiff was not actually 
disabled within the meaning of the ADA at 
the time of defendant’s alleged conduct.
(2) Actual Disability Claim under NYSHRL
Plaintiff correctly notes that the definition 
of “disability” is broader under the NYSHRL 
than it is under the ADA. See State Div. o f
10
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Human Rights v. Xerox Corp., 65 N.Y.2d 213, 
218-19 (1985); Reeves v. Johnson Controls 
World Servs., Inc., 140 F.3d 144, 155 (2d 
Cir.1998) (“Regardless of the [fact that the] 
legislative history of the [NYSHRL indicates] 
that the statutory definition of disability was 
intended to be coextensive with that of the 
federal disability statutes, we are bound by the 
construction of the statute propounded by the 
state’s highest court.”). In New York, the 
term “disability” is not limited to physical or 
mental impairments, but “may also include 
‘medical’ impairments. In addition, to qualify 
as a disability, the condition may manifest 
itself in one of two ways: (1) by preventing 
the exercise of a normal bodily function or (2) 
by being ‘demonstrable by medically accepted 
clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques.’” 
Xerox Corp., 65 N.Y.2d at 218-19; see N.Y. 
Exec. Law § 292(21) (“The term ‘disability’ 
means a physical, mental or medical 
impairment resulting from anatomical, 
physiological, genetic or neurological 
conditions which prevents the exercise of a 
normal bodily function or is demonstrable by 
medically accepted clinical or laboratory 
diagnostic techniques.”). Thus, under state 
law, a disability need only be a demonstrable 
impairment; it does not have to substantially 
limit a major life activity. See Reeves, 140 
F.3d at 154.
As noted above, depression can constitute 
a disability under both the ADA and 
NYSHRL. See Reilly v. Revlon, Inc., 620 F. 
Supp. 2d 524, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“As 
defendants concede, both the State and the 
City recognize depression as a ‘disability.’ 
Therefore, [plaintiff] has satisfied the first test 
for getting to trial on her non-federal 
disability claims as well.”); cf. Matya v. 
Dexter Corp., 250 F. App’x 408, 410 (2d Cir. 
2007) (affirming district court decision that 
assumed that plaintiff who had depression had 
demonstrated a “disability” under the
NYSHRL). Although McCowan’s depression 
did not “substantially limit” her “major life 
activities” at the time of the adverse 
employment actions, McCowan has presented 
sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue 
of fact as to whether her depression was 
“demonstrable by medically accepted clinical 
or laboratory diagnostic techniques” at that 
time. See N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(21). 
Specifically, McCowan presented an affidavit 
of her treating doctor, Dr. Diana Su, stating 
that McCowan’s “symptoms [of Major 
Depressive Disorder] improved and she was 
able to return to work in or about September 
2000. However, I continued treating her for 
depression on and off through June 2006.” 
(Pl.’s Ex. B A ff of Diana Su ^ 5; see also 
Pl.’s Ex. BB, Medical Records.) Accordingly, 
if  the evidence presented by plaintiff is 
credited, a reasonable jury could find that she 
had a disability within the meaning of the 
NYSHRL at the time of HSBC’s alleged 
adverse employment actions.
(ii) “Regarded As” Disabled Claim
Plaintiff also claims that defendants 
discriminated against her in violation of the 
ADA and NYSHRL on the basis of a 
perceived disability. Plaintiff claims she 
qualifies under the ADA and NYSHRL as 
disabled based on the third subsection -  
namely, that she was perceived as having a 
disability that substantially limits one or more 
of the major life activities of such individual. 
Specifically, plaintiff contends that she has a 
“regarded as disabled” claim against HSBC 
based upon Ms. Lin’s perception that she was 
significantly restricted in her ability to work 
due to her depression. (Pl.’s Opp. at 11.) As 
set forth below, the Court concludes that 
plaintiff’ s “regarded as” claim survives 
summary judgment.
“Under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(c)
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(“regarded as disabled”), the decisive issue is 
the employer’s perception of his or her 
employee’s alleged impairment.” Giordano v. 
City o f N.Y., 274 F.3d 740, 748 (2d Cir. 2001). 
A plaintiff “is regarded as having an 
impairment” if she:
(1) has a physical or mental 
impairment that does not substantially 
limit major life activities but is treated 
by an employer as constituting such a 
limitation; (2) has a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits 
major life activities only as a result of 
the attitude of an employer toward 
such impairment; (3) or has none of 
the impairments defined in (b) of this 
section but is treated by an employer 
as having such an impairment.
29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(e). To succeed under 
this “perceived” or “regarded as” ADA claim, 
a plaintiff must show more than “that the 
employer regarded that individual as 
somehow disabled; rather, the plaintiff must 
show that the employer regarded the 
individual as disabled within the meaning of 
the ADA.” Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 386 
F.3d 192, 201 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Colwell 
v. Suffolk County Police D ep’t, 158 F.3d 635, 
646 (2d Cir. 1998)). The Supreme Court has 
stated that an employee can be “regarded as” 
disabled in two ways: “(1) a covered entity 
mistakenly believes that a person has a 
physical impairment that substantially limits 
one or more major life activities, or (2) a 
covered entity mistakenly believes that an 
actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially 
limits one or more major life activities.” 
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 
481 (1999), overturned by 42 U.S.C. § 12102. 
Plaintiff’ s claims fall in the second 
category— she alleges that defendant 
mistakenly believed that plaintiff’s actual, 
nonlimiting impairment, namely, her
depression, substantially limited her in the 
major life activity of working. (Pl.’s Opp. at 
11.) This requires a demonstration that 
defendant “perceived [plaintiff] to be 
incapable of working in a broad range of jobs 
suitable for persons of her age, experience, 
and training.” Colwell, 158 F.3d at 647 
(citation omitted). Defendant contends that 
plaintiff cannot make this showing because 
neither Ms. Lin nor Mr. Panarelli considered 
plaintiff to be unable to work in a broad class 
of jobs.
The Court concludes that plaintiff has set 
forth sufficient evidence to create a triable 
issue of fact regarding whether defendant 
regarded plaintiff as disabled. Specifically, 
plaintiff has submitted evidence that Ms. Lin 
made remarks in front of plaintiff about 
depression and depressed individuals. 
Plaintiff has also submitted evidence that Ms. 
Lin restricted plaintiff to performing entry- 
level tasks and Ms. Lin made statements 
regarding plaintiff’s inability to resume her 
role at work when she returned from disability 
leave. (McCowan Aff. ^ 11 (“Lin frequently 
remarked in front of my colleagues and 
members of Human Resources that the RSU 
functioned fine without me during my 
disability leave, that I was ‘slow’ and was not 
as good as my co-workers.”); id. ^ 12 (“After 
I returned from my last disability leave, Lin 
stated to me again, ‘You must have cracked.’
. . . Lin gave me entry-level assignments and 
spelled out instructions for tasks I had 
performed for 20 years. She treated me as 
though I had become brain damaged and 
could no longer function in the job I held for 
24 years.”). Upon plaintiff’ s return, Ms. Lin 
instructed plaintiff’ s coworkers to “give [her] 
a chance, she may have questions.” 
(McCowan Aff. ^ 17.) Viewing this evidence 
in the light most favorable to plaintiff, a 
reasonable juror could find that Ms. Lin was 
suggesting that plaintiff would not be capable
12
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of performing her job upon her return because 
of her depression. There is also direct 
evidence that Ms. Lin did regard plaintiff as 
unable to perform her job upon her return 
from leave. Specifically, at her deposition, 
Ms. Lin testified:
Q: After twenty-four years as an 
employee of HSBC, were you saying 
that Ms. McCowan was unable to 
perform the duties of a special support 
specialist when she came back from 
disability leave?
* * *
A: She tried her best to perform to 
assume her role when she first came 
back and then issues -  all the other 
issues that we stated here started to 
arise.
Q: But what do you mean ‘she tried 
her best’? Does that mean that she 
was unsuccessful?
A: Yes.
(Lin Dep. at 121:7-21.) Ms. Lin also reported 
to Mr. Panarelli, and Mr. Panarelli agreed, 
that plaintiff was only capable of answering 
the telephone and filing. (See Pl.’s Ex. L, 
Email from Michelle Lin to Philip Panarelli, 
Feb. 27, 2006 (“If you still want to keep her 
employment with the Bank, I suggest that we 
assign her to handle special projects only 
(e.g., filings, pick up the RSU Dept. 
Phone).”). Mr. Panarelli testified that he 
agreed with Ms. Lin’s assessment of 
plaintiff’ s abilities:
A: I agreed with that decision, yes.
Q: You agreed that Chris should 
handle only filing and picking up the
phone in February of 2006?
A: Michelle -  Michelle was her 
manager. Whatever Michelle felt was 
important, however she wanted to 
handle the group. I respected 
Michelle and I let Michelle run the 
department.
(Pl.’s Ex. F, Deposition of Philip Panarelli 
(hereinafter “Panarelli Dep.”) at 61:9-17.)
Plaintiff also testified at her deposition 
that other coworkers treated her differently 
after she returned from her disability leave in 
2005. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that her 
coworker, Ms. Carboneri, treated her as 
though she lacked intellectual ability and was 
incapable of performing her job. (McCowan 
Dep. at 111:1-9 (stating that upon her return 
to work, Ms. Lin and Ms. Carboneri 
insinuated that plaintiff was “stupid” and 
knew “nothing . . . because of depression”).) 
Plaintiff also testified that Ms. Lin stated that 
plaintiff “must have cracked,” (McCowan 
Dep. at 111:20-113:14) and “had no 
manners.” (McCowan Dep. at 112:25, 
113:23-25.) Plaintiff further asserts that Ms. 
Lin accused plaintiff of making errors that 
were in fact made by other employees and 
criticized McCowan loudly and harshly in 
front of coworkers for “very minor 
infractions.” (McCowan Aff. ^ 8.)
The Court recognizes that plaintiff “bears 
the burden of demonstrating that her employer 
‘perceived her to be incapable of working in 
a broad range of jobs’ suitable for one of 
similar age, experience, and training.” 
Johnson v. City o f N.Y., 326 F. Supp. 2d 364, 
369-70 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (quoting Ryan v. 
Grae & Rybicki, P.C., 135 F.3d at 872). The 
Court concludes that plaintiff’s evidence is 
sufficient to survive summary judgment on 
that issue. Accepting plaintiff’ s evidence as
13
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true and drawing all reasonable inferences in 
her favor, a reasonable jury could conclude 
that Ms. Lin and Mr. Panarelli regarded 
plaintiff as incapable of performing jobs that 
required completion of tasks other than filing 
and answering telephones. This would 
sufficiently demonstrate their belief that 
plaintiff was incapable of working in a broad 
range of jobs, as many jobs require tasks 
beyond filing and answering calls. See Russo 
v. Sysco FoodServs. o f Albany, L.L.C., 488 F. 
Supp. 2d 228, 235 (N.D.N.Y. 2007)
(concluding that plaintiff was “perceived as” 
disabled under the ADA when plaintiff’ s 
employer “regarded plaintiff as unable to 
work in any job requiring the operation of 
trucks, forklifts, or any other company vehicle 
[because p]ositions requiring the operation of 
all vehicles and heavy equipment constitute[ 
] a class of jobs”); Greenberg v. N.Y. City 
Transit Auth., 336 F. Supp. 2d 225, 238 
(E.D.N.Y. 2004) (“The simple fact that, 
following plaintiff’ s knee injury, plaintiff was 
restricted from working in any job that 
involved bending, crouching, crawling or 
kneeling and was reclassified to the position 
of TPAA reveals that he was regarded by 
defendant as being precluded from a broad 
class ofjobs.”); Simms v. City o f N.Y., 160 F. 
Supp. 2d 398, 405 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (“As 
Plaintiff is precluded from more than one type 
of job within the [Fire] Department, the Court 
finds that Defendants regard Plaintiff as being 
substantially limited in his ability to work.”). 
Thus, after carefully analyzing the evidence in 
this case, the Court finds that plaintiff has 
presented sufficient evidence to survive 
summary judgment on the issue of whether 
she was perceived as being a “qualified 
individual with a disability” within the 
meaning of the ADA and the NYSHRL.
(iii) Record of Disability Claim5
The ADA6 also prohibits discrimination 
against persons with a record of disability in 
order to “ensure that people are not 
discriminated against because of a history of 
disability.” 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 App., § 
1630.2(k). According to the EEOC:
This part of the definition is satisfied 
if a record relied on by an employer 
indicates that the individual has or has 
had a su b stan tia lly  lim iting  
impairment. The im pairm ent 
indicated in the record must be an 
impairment that would substantially 
limit one or more of the individual’ s 
major life activities.
Id. The record must be one that shows an
5 Although plaintiff did not use the term “record of 
disability” in her complaint, she alleged 
specifically that she had her thyroid removed, 
which resulted in her experiencing bouts of 
depression and that this required her to take 
several disability leaves of absence from her 
employment. (Compl. | |  17-18.) Plaintiff s 
complaint also alleged that her supervisors, 
including Ms. Lin, were aware ofplaintiff  s severe 
depression when she was required to take leave. 
(Id.) It is clear from the record that the issues 
associated with plaintiff  s “record of disability” 
claim were fully explored during discovery and 
that defendant has not been prejudiced in any way 
by plaintiff  s inclusion ofthis claim. Accordingly, 
the Court construes plaintiff  s complaint as 
alleging such a claim.
6 For the purposes of this summary judgment 
motion, analysis of plaintiff  s claims under the 
ADA and NYSHRL yields the same results. See, 
e.g., Morris v. City o f N.Y., 153 F. Supp. 2d 494, 
499-500 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“For the purposes of 
this [summary judgment] motion, analysis of 
plaintiff  s claims under the ADA and the 
NYSHRL is identical.”).
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impairment that satisfies the ADA; a record 
reflecting a plaintiff’ s classification as 
disabled for other purposes or under other 
standards is not enough. See id. As discussed 
supra, depression qualifies as a disability 
under the ADA and NYSHRL. Plaintiff has 
submitted evidence, which HSBC does not 
contest, that she had a record of depression, 
which substantially limited her ability to work 
when she was affected by it. Moreover, there 
is evidence that HSBC was aware of 
plaintiff’s history of depression. Accordingly, 
plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to 
survive summary judgment on the issue of 
whether she has a record of impairment under 
both the ADA and NYSHRL.
c. Ability to Perform Job
Plaintiff has also presented sufficient 
evidence to survive summary judgment on the 
issue of whether she was fully capable of 
performing her position at HSBC without 
reasonable accommodation when she returned 
to work after her leave. Plaintiff was 
employed at HSBC for twenty-four years. 
Until her final evaluation, plaintiff did not 
receive unsatisfactory evaluations during her 
tenure at HSBC; she consistently received 
rankings that she met or exceeded 
expectations in her performance reviews. 
(See Pl.’s Ex. R, HSBC’s Performance 
Evaluations of Plaintiff, 1984-2006.) 
Plaintiff’s reviews, including those filed by 
Ms. Lin prior to the final review, indicate that 
plaintiff generally conducted herself in a 
professional manner and was cooperative with 
her peers and supervisors. (Id.) Mr.
Panarelli’s testimony affirms that, prior to Ms. 
Lin joining the RSU, he does not remember 
having any specific problems with plaintiff’s 
performance and that he and plaintiff had a 
“good working relationship.” (Panarelli Dep. 
at 14:13-21.) Although Ms. Lin gave plaintiff 
an overall negative final evaluation in January
2006 (for the 2005 annual year), plaintiff’ s 
performance evaluation stated that she 
“complete[d] her assignments on a routine 
basis and assume[d] additional responsibilities 
of the RSU staff when they [were] on 
vacation.” (Pl.’s Ex. Q, HSBC Performance 
Evaluation of Plaintiff, 2006.) That 
evaluation also noted that plaintiff “serviced 
customers with courtesy” and “was willing to 
accept additional work and to try to resolve 
problem[s] independently.” (Id.)
Plaintiff has also presented evidence that, 
during 2006, she completed her job tasks and 
addressed important matters with Ms. Lin. 
Specifically, plaintiff has presented evidence 
that on March 30, 2006, plaintiff sent Ms. Lin 
an email regarding her coworker’s inadvertent 
payment of a fraudulent check. (Pl.’s Ex. T, 
Email from Christiane McCowan to Michelle 
Lin, Mar. 30, 2006.) In April 2006, plaintiff 
also advised Ms. Lin that she had discovered 
files that required significant time and effort 
to organize. (Pl.’s Ex. U, Emails from 
Christiane McCowan to Michelle Lin, Apr. 5, 
2006 and Apr. 10, 2006.) Moreover, 
defendant argues that plaintiff was terminated 
for insubordination—not for an inability to 
perform her job properly. Accordingly, a 
reasonable jury could conclude that plaintiff 
was able to perform her job when she returned 
to work from disability leave and, thus, 
summary judgment on that issue in 
defendant’s favor is unwarranted.
d. Adverse Employment Action
Under the final prong of the four-part test 
for a prima facie claim under the ADA, 
plaintiff must demonstrate that she was 
subject to an adverse employment action as a 
result of her disability. Ryan, 135 F.3d at 869­
70. A plaintiff suffers an adverse employment 
action:
15
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if  he or she endures a materially 
adverse change in the terms and 
conditions of employment. T o b e  
materially adverse a change in 
working conditions must be more 
disruptive than a mere inconvenience 
or an alteration of job responsibilities 
[and it may] be indicated by a 
term ination o f employment, a 
demotion evidenced by a decrease in 
wage or salary, a less distinguished 
title, a material loss of benefits, 
significantly diminished material 
responsibilities, or other indices . . . 
unique to a particular situation.
Galabya v. New York City Bd. o f Educ., 202 
F.3d 636, 640 (2d Cir. 2000) (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). However, 
“less flagrant reprisals by employers may 
indeed be adverse.” Wanamaker v. 
Columbian Rope Co., 108 F.3d 462, 466 (2d 
Cir. 1997). “Courts have held that 
termination, demotion, denial of promotion, 
addition of responsibilities, involuntary 
transfer that entails objectively inferior 
working conditions, denial of benefits, denial 
of a requested employment accommodation, 
denial of training that may lead to 
prom otional opportunities, and shift 
assignments that make a normal life difficult 
for the employee, among other things, 
constitute adverse employment actions.” 
Little v. NBC, 210 F. Supp. 2d 330, 384 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002); see also Feingold v. New 
York, 366 F.3d 138, 152-53 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(holding that the “assignment of a 
disproportionately heavy workload” can 
constitute an adverse employment action); 
Galabya, 202 F.3d at 641 (“ [A] transfer is an 
adverse employment action if it results in a 
change in responsibilities so significant as to 
constitute a setback to the plaintiff’ s career.”); 
de la Cruz v. N.Y. City Human Res. Admin. 
D ep’t o f Soc. Servs., 82 F.3d 16, 21 (2d Cir.
1996) (finding that transfer from elite division 
could constitute adverse action); Wright v. 
N.Y. City Off-Track Betting Corp., No. 05 
Civ. 9790, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22567, at 
*10 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2004) (“The three 
remaining adverse actions alleged by plaintiff 
-  deprivation of training, treatment of leave 
hours and assignment of menial ‘make-work’ 
tasks -  appear to bear on either plaintiff’ s 
opportunities for professional growth and 
career advancement or directly on plaintiff’ s 
compensation. Accordingly, . . . I conclude 
that a jury could reasonably conclude that 
these events were adverse employment 
actions.”); Neratko v. Frank, 31 F. Supp. 2d 
270, 293 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (“Allegations of 
inferior and less desirable work duties may 
constitute an adverse employment action.”).
Plaintiff alleges that she was subjected to 
adverse employment actions as a result of her 
disability. Specifically, plaintiff contends 
that, as a result of her disability, she received 
a poor performance evaluation that resulted in 
her being denied a salary increase and a bonus 
in 2006; and she was terminated from her 
position at HSBC. Negative evaluations 
alone, “without any accompanying adverse 
result,” are insufficient to constitute an 
adverse employment action. Valentine v. 
Standard & Poor’s, 50 F. Supp. 2d 262, 283­
84 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). Plaintiff has submitted 
evidence that, as a result of plaintiff’ s review, 
she was denied a salary increase and a bonus 
for the first time, and Ms. Lin placed plaintiff 
on a list of individuals to be “managed out” of 
HSBC. (Pl.’s Ex. P, Email from Jennifer 
Warner to Jolanda Mehler, Mar. 14, 2006.) In 
particular, plaintiff asserts that her negative 
2005 evaluation, which was received in 
January 2006, resulted in her not receiving a 
pay increase or bonus for the year 2005, even 
though she had received a pay increase and 
bonus every year for at least the prior ten 
years. (McCowan Aff. ^ 18.) The
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combination of plaintiff receiving a negative 
evaluation in January 2006, being denied a 
salary increase, and being placed on a list of 
individuals to be “managed out” is sufficient 
to create genuine issues of material fact as to 
whether plaintiff suffered an adverse 
employment action for purposes of plaintiff’ s 
claim.7 See Bennett, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 248 
(“The only surviving adverse employment 
action is the denial of a raise in 1997.”); 
Naftchi v. N.Y. Univ., 14 F. Supp. 2d 473, 
489-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“ [I]t appears that the 
adverse employment action requirement is 
satisfied by the denial of raises for 1996, 
1997, and 1998 and the elimination of 
[plaintiff’ s] office space in October 1997.”). 
In any event, plaintiff also contends that her 
employment with HSBC was terminated as a 
result of her disability. Termination of 
employment is an adverse employment action 
sufficient to support a prima facie case of 
disability discrimination under the ADA. 
Sista v. CDC Ixis North America, Inc., 445 
F.3d 161, 169 (2d Cir. 2006) (asserting that 
there is not “any question that termination is 
an adverse employment action”). Thus, 
plaintiff has put forth sufficient evidence to 
overcome defendant’s summary judgment 
motion on the adverse employment action 
requirement both with respect to her negative 
evaluation in January 2006 (and the
7 To the extent that defendant claims that this 
alleged adverse employment action is time-barred 
under the ADA, the Court disagrees. Under the 
ADA, a plaintiff must file an administrative 
charge of discrimination with the EEOC no more 
than 300 days after an alleged discriminatory act 
to maintain a lawsuit on such act in federal court. 
See 42U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e); 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a); 
Harris v. City o f N.Y., 186 F.3d 243, 247-48 (2d 
Cir. 1999). Here, the alleged negative evaluation 
and denial of pay increase/bonus took place in 
early 2006 and the EEOC complaint in September 
2006. Thus, this claim is timely.
accompanying denial of a pay increase and 
bonus) and her termination in April 2006.8
Finally, on the issue of causation, plaintiff 
has offered more than mere “suspicions of 
discrimination” to support her claim that she 
was subjected to an adverse employment 
action as a result of her disability. See Garvin 
v. Potter, 367 F. Supp. 2d 548, 566 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005). Instead, as discussed in detail infra on 
the issue of pretext, plaintiff has set forth 
evidence, including her own sworn testimony, 
that creates genuine issues of fact as to 
whether or not there were any actual problems 
with her performance. Moreover, plaintiff has 
presented evidence (including emails), from 
which, when construed most favorably to the
8 To the extent that plaintiff argues that other 
incidents involving Ms. Lin’s alleged excessive 
scrutiny and job assignments constitute 
independent adverse employment actions, the 
Court disagrees under the circumstances of this 
case. As a threshold matter, any discrete acts that 
occurred more than 300 days prior to the 
September 22, 2006 EEOC filing are time-barred 
under the ADA, and plaintiff has failed to set forth 
any facts that would warrant waiver, estoppel, or 
equitable tolling. See Smith v. McGinnis, 208 
F.3d 13, 17 (2d Cir. 2000). In any event, given 
the absence of any evidence that these alleged 
earlier incidents of excessive scrutiny or job 
assignments had any negative results, such as a 
denial of pay increase or bonus or a suspension, 
such alleged acts cannot constitute adverse 
employment actions as a matter of law. See, e.g., 
Hubbard v. Port. Auth. o f N.Y. and N.J., No. 05 
Civ. 4396 (PAC), 2008 WL 464694, at *12 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2008); Bennett v. Watson 
Wyatt & Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 236, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001); Castro v. N.Y. City Bd. Of Educ. Personnel, 
No. 96 Civ. 6314 (MBM), 1998 WL 108004, at *7 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 1998) (citation omitted). The 
Court need not address at this juncture whether 
these acts are still admissible as to the remaining 
claims, including as background or on the issue of 
motivation.
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plaintiff, a reasonable jury could conclude that 
Ms. Lin and Mr. Panarelli regarded plaintiff 
as incapable of performing her job properly 
because of her depression. Accordingly, 
plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence 
from which a reasonable jury could conclude 
that plaintiff was subjected to adverse 
employment actions due to defendant’s 
employees’ beliefs about her abilities 
resulting from her depression.
In sum, construing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to plaintiff, plaintiff has 
presented sufficient evidence to support a 
prima facie case of disability discrimination.
2. Pretext Analysis
Once plaintiff establishes a prima facie 
case, the burden shifts to the defendant to 
“ ‘ a r t i c u l a t e  s o m e  l e g i t i m a t e ,  
nondiscriminatory reason for the’” adverse 
employment action. Patterson v. County o f 
Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 221 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(quoting O ’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers 
Corp, 517 U.S. 308, 311 (1996)). If the 
defendant carries that burden, “the burden 
shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate by 
competent evidence that ‘the legitimate 
reasons offered by the defendant were not its 
true reasons, but were a pretext for 
discrimination.’” Patterson, 375 F.3d at 221 
(quoting Texas D ep’t o f Cmty. Affairs v. 
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)). “‘The 
ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact 
that the defendant intentionally discriminated 
against the plaintiff remains at all times with 
the plaintiff.’” Id. (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. 
at 253).
To meet this burden, the plaintiff may rely 
on evidence presented to establish her prima 
facie case as well as additional evidence. 
Such additional evidence may include direct 
or circumstantial evidence of discrimination.
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 
97-101 (2003). It is not sufficient, however, 
for a plaintiff merely to show that she satisfies 
“McDonnell Douglas’ s minimal requirements 
of a prima facie case” and to put forward 
“evidence from which a factfinder could find 
that the employer’s explanation . . . was 
false.” James v. N.Y. RacingAss’n, 233 F.3d 
149, 153 (2d Cir. 2000). Instead, the key 
inquiry is whether there is sufficient evidence 
in the record from which a reasonable trier of 
fact could find in favor of plaintiff on the 
ultimate issue, that is, whether the record 
contains sufficient evidence to support an 
inference of discrimination. See id. at 153-54; 
Connell v. Consol. Edison Co. o f N.Y., Inc., 
109 F. Supp. 2d 202, 207-08 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
As the Second Circuit observed in James, 
“the way to tell whether a plaintiff’s case is 
sufficient to sustain a verdict is to analyze the 
particular evidence to determine whether it 
reasonably supports an inference of the facts 
p l a i n t i f f  mus t  p r o v e — par t i cu l a r ly  
discrimination.” 233 F.3d at 157; see also 
Norton v. Sam ’s Club, 145 F.3d 114, 118 (2d 
Cir. 1998) (“The thick accretion of cases 
interpreting this burden-shifting framework 
should not obscure the simple principle that 
lies at the core of anti-discrimination cases. 
In these, as in most other cases, the plaintiff 
has the ultimate burden of persuasion.”).
Defendant has articulated a legitimate, 
non-d iscrim inato ry  reason for Ms. 
McCowan’s termination. In particular, 
defendant contends that Mr. Panarelli made 
the decision to terminate plaintiff based on the 
events of the April 11, 2006 meeting that was 
attended by Ms. McCowan, Mr. Panarelli, Ms. 
Lin, and Javier Evans. According to 
defendant, at that meeting, plaintiff was told 
that she would be reporting to Ms. Carboneri 
instead of Ms. Lin, and that as a result of that 
directive, plaintiff “became upset, said that
18
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she refused to report to Ms. Carboneri and 
walked out of the room without being 
excused.” (Def.’s 56.1 ^ 35.) Defendant 
contends that after plaintiff left the meeting 
without his permission, Mr. Panarelli decided 
to terminate plaintiff’ s employment for 
insubordination. (Def.’s 56.1 ^  36-37.) 
Insubordination and other conduct that 
disrupts a workplace are legitimate reasons to 
terminate an employee. Matima v. Cell, 228 
F. 3d 68, 79 (2d Cir. 2000).
The Court concludes that plaintiff has 
presented sufficient evidence to create a 
material disputed issue of fact regarding 
whether the reason for plaintiff’ s termination 
was a pretext for discrimination.9 If plaintiff’ s 
evidence is credited by a jury, and construing 
that evidence most favorably to plaintiff, 
plaintiff has presented evidence from which a 
jury could conclude that Ms. Lin believed 
that, because of plaintiff’ s disability or 
perceived disability, plaintiff was incapable of 
performing tasks other than answering phones 
and filing papers. (See Pl.’s Ex. L, Email 
from Michelle Lin to Philip Panarelli, Feb. 27, 
2006 (“If you still want to keep her 
employment with the Bank, I suggest that we 
assign her to handle special projects only 
(e.g., filings, pick up the RSU Dept. 
Phone).”). Ms. Lin communicated these 
concerns to her superiors at HSBC and pushed 
for plaintiff’ s termination. (See, e.g., Pl.’s Ex. 
K, Email from Michelle Lin to Philip
9 The Court reaches the same conclusion as it 
relates to the negative performance evaluation in
2006 and the accompanying denial of a pay 
increase or bonus. Although defendant contends 
that the negative evaluation and pay decision were 
based upon her poor performance, plaintiff s 
evidence, which is discussed above, is sufficient to 
raise a genuine issue of fact on the issue of pretext 
as it relates to that articulated non-discriminatory 
reason.
Panarelli, Jan. 11, 2006 (“I am submitting my 
recommendation to terminate Chris’ s 
employment with HSBC for the benefits of 
the Department.”); id. (“If the documentation 
I e-mailed you on 1/3/06 does not suffice to 
terminate Chris’ employment with the Bank, 
please let me know what else I need to do.”); 
Pl.’s Ex. J, Email from Michelle Lin to Karine 
Joseph, Sept. 7, 2005 (“Further to our 
conversation on 9/2, did you get a chance to 
look at Chris’ file? Due to her medical 
history in the past and the fact that she has 
been c[o]ddled too many years in HSBC, I 
want to proceed cautiously with the most 
appropriate approach that HR will 
recommend.”). Despite Ms. Lin’ s and Mr. 
Panarelli’s testimony regarding their 
perception of plaintiff’ s abilities once she 
returned from leave, plaintiff testified that she 
was fully capable of resuming her duties after 
she returned to work. The Court is mindful 
that discriminatory considerations such as 
disability could play into the “formation of 
subjective impressions” by supervisors, such 
as Ms. Lin. See Weiss v. JPMorgan Chase & 
Co., 332 F. App’x 659, 661 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(citation omitted). Thus, if  all of plaintiff’ s 
evidence is credited, the Court concludes that 
a rational jury could infer that Ms. Lin 
believed that plaintiff was impaired at 
thinking and functioning due to her disability, 
and that, as a result thereof, plaintiff was 
terminated. (See Pl.’s Ex. R, 2006 Evaluation 
of Chris McCowan at 3 (“Chris was on leave 
of absence for most of the first half of 2005. 
She came back to work on 4/27/05 and has 
tried her best to assume her role as a Senior 
Commercial Support Specialist.”).)
Similarly, plaintiff has created genuine 
issues of fact regarding pretext as it relates to 
her performance evaluation in early 2006 for 
the year 2005. For example, plaintiff points 
out that, even on plaintiff’ s 2006 review, in 
which Ms. Lin rated plaintiff’ s performance
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as “Marginal,” Ms. Lin still noted that 
plaintiff “serviced customers with courtesy” 
and “mainta ined posi t ive working 
relationships with the relationship managers 
and RSU staff.” (Pl.’s Ex. Q.) That same 
review also noted that “Chris completed her 
assignments on a routine basis and assumed 
the additional responsibilities of the RSU staff 
when they were on vacation.” (Id.) All of 
plaintiff’ s prior years’ reviews indicated that 
she had performed her job well, was 
cooperative, and was a team player. (See Pl.’s 
Ex. R.) Prior positive performance 
evaluations may be used to demonstrate 
pretext. See Zimmermann v. Assocs. First 
Capital Corp., 251 F.3d 376, 382-83 (2d Cir. 
2001) (“To the extent that the Defendant 
proffered Zimmermann’s alleged poor 
performance as the reason for her discharge, 
she provided ample evidence of good 
performance and the complete absence of any 
negative evaluations.”). Moreover, Ms. Lin 
asserted that she scrutinized plaintiff’ s 
behavior at work due to plaintiff’s excessive 
personal phone calls, but plaintiff testified at 
her deposition that she did not engage in 
personal phone calls at work. (See McCowan 
Dep. at 101-06.) Thus, there are disputed 
issues o f fact regarding p la in tiff’s 
performance at work upon her return from 
disability leave and sufficient other evidence 
in the record to require the issue of pretext to 
be submitted to the jury.
Although defendant contends that any 
alleged discriminatory motivation by Ms. Lin 
is irrelevant because the termination decision 
was made by Ms. Lin’s boss (Mr. Panarelli), 
the Court finds that argument unpersuasive. 
There is evidence in the record that Ms. Lin 
communicated her unfavorable opinion of 
p la in tiff through email and formal 
evaluations. Thus, a rational jury could 
conclude, if  Ms. Lin’s discriminatory motives 
are proven, that the decision to terminate
plaintiff was made as a result of Ms. Lin’s 
urging to terminate plaintiff based on such 
discriminatory motives. In other words, there 
is evidence that Ms. Lin’s criticisms and 
evaluations of plaintiff were considered by the 
actual decisionmaker—here, Mr. Panarelli. 
Under the so-called “cat’s paw” theory of 
liability, “‘the impermissible bias of a single 
individual can infect the entire group of 
collective decisionmakers,’ at least when the 
decisionmakers are overly deferential to the 
biased individual’s recommendations.” Baron 
v. N.Y. City D ep’t o f Educ., No. 06-CV-2816 
(FB)(MDG), 2009 WL 1938975, at *6 
(E.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing Fullard v. City o f 
N.Y., 274 F. Supp. 2d 347, 357 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003) and quoting Jamieson v. Poughkeepsie 
City Sch. Dist., 195 F. Supp. 2d 457, 474 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002)); see Bickerstaff v. Vassar 
Coll., 196 F.3d 435, 450 (2d Cir. 1999) (“We 
recognize that the impermissible bias of a 
single individual at any stage of the promoting 
process may taint the ultimate employment 
decision in violation of Title VII. This is true 
even absent evidence of illegitimate bias on 
the part of the ultimate decision maker, so 
long as the individual shown to have the 
impermissible bias played a meaningful role 
in the promotion process.” (internal citation 
omitted)); see also Dumas v. Union Pac. R.R., 
294 F. App’x 822, 826 (5th Cir. 2008) (“ [A] 
plaintiff can make out a prima facie case by 
showing that other employees, with 
discriminatory motives, had influence or 
leverage over the official decisionmaker.” 
(citation and internal quotation omitted)); 
Metzler v. Fed. Home Loan Bank o f Topeka, 
464 F.3d 1164, 1179 n.7 (10th Cir. 2006) 
(“[I]n certain circumstances, an employer can 
be held liable for a subordinate employee’s 
prejudice even if the decision-maker lacked 
the required intent where the decision-maker 
failed to independently investigate the 
subordinate’s complaint against the former 
employee and instead merely followed the
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biased recommendation of the subordinate.”); 
Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th 
Cir. 1990) (“ [If the committee] acted as the 
conduit of a [supervisor’s] prejudice—his 
cat’s paw—the innocence of its members 
would not spare the company from liability.”); 
Sadki v. Suny Coll. at Brockport, 310 F. Supp. 
2d 506, 515 n.5 (W.D.N.Y. 2004) (endorsing 
the cat’s paw theory of employer liability for 
discrimination and noting that “[c]ertainly it 
would not be surprising if a university 
president gives great deference to a dean’s 
recommendations for faculty positions, and 
the manner in which [the president] endorsed 
[the dean’s] recommendation— ‘I agree with 
your analysis. PY’— suggests that [the 
president] did so here.”). Indeed, Mr. 
Panarelli testified that he relied on Ms. Lin’s 
evaluation of plaintiff in forming his own 
perceptions about plaintiff: “Michelle was her 
manager. Whatever Michelle felt was 
important, however she wanted to handle the 
group. I respected Michelle and I let Michelle 
run the department.” (Panarelli Dep. At 
61:14-17.) Thus, a reasonable jury could find 
that Ms. Lin’s alleged discriminatory bias 
toward plaintiff, if  proven, infected the 
decision-making process that ultimately 
resulted in plaintiff’ s termination.
Furthermore, although defendant claims 
that Mr. Panarelli made the decision to 
terminate plaintiff for insubordination after 
the April 11 meeting, plaintiff claimed that 
she left the meeting because she was feeling 
ill and that she did provide an explanation 
before leaving the room. Plaintiff further 
testified that, although she did express 
dissatisfaction with the decision that she 
would report to Ms. Carboneri going forward, 
she did not refuse to do so. Plaintiff claims 
that, upon being told that she would be now 
reporting to Ms. Carboneri, she asked how 
reporting to Ms. Carboneri would be any 
different, but did not receive an answer. (Pl.’s
56.1 U 33.) Plaintiff claims that she was told 
by Mr. Panarelli to “think it over.” (Id.) 
Plaintiff also has testified that she left the 
meeting because she was feeling ill, so she 
excused herself to the ladies’ room. (Id.) She 
thereafter did not return to the meeting 
because she believed that the meeting was 
over. Thus, there is a disputed issue of fact as 
to the reasoning underlying plaintiff’s 
termination from HSBC: specifically, there is 
a disputed issue as to whether there was 
insubordination by plaintiff on April 11 or 
whe t he r  the c laim of  p l a i n t i f f ’s 
insubordination was a mere pretext for Ms. 
Lin’s reasoning.
In sum, although defendant has pointed to 
portions of the record that defendant argues 
undermine the strength of various aspects of 
p l a i n t i f f ’ s p ro f f e r ed  ev idence  of  
discrimination as it relates to her negative 
evaluation and termination in 2006, the 
overall evidence is sufficient, when construed 
most favorably to plaintiff, to survive 
defendant’s summary judgment motion and 
have the discrimination claims, including the 
critical issues of credibility, decided by a jury.
B. Retaliation
Plaintiff next brings a claim that defendant 
retaliated against her by terminating her 
because she submitted a complaint disputing 
the allegedly false accusations in her January 
2006 performance evaluation and she notified 
defendant that she intended to file a “formal” 
harassment complaint against Ms. Lin based 
on Ms. Lin’s alleged discriminatory conduct. 
In particular, plaintiff informed Mr. Panarelli 
that she believed Ms. Lin may have been 
treating her in this manner due to her 
depression. (Def.’s 56.1 U 43; Pl.’s 56.1 U 43.) 
According to plaintiff, she also complained 
about Ms. Lin’s harassment to Javier Evans 
and Jennifer Warner in 2006. (Pl.’s 56.1 U
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44.) As set forth below, although defendant 
argues that plaintiff’ s retaliation claim cannot 
survive summary judgment, the Court 
disagrees.
1. Legal Standard
As in the case of discrimination claims, a 
claim of retaliation is analyzed under the 
three-step burden-shifting analysis set forth by 
the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas. 
See Treglia v. Town o f Manlius, 313 F.3d 713, 
719 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Weixel v. Bd. o f 
Educ. o f N.Y., 287 F.3d 138, 148 (2d Cir. 
2002)); Lovejoy-Wilson v. Noco Motor Fuel, 
Inc., 263 F.3d 208, 223 (2d Cir. 2001) (“We 
analyze a retaliation claim under the ADA 
using the same framework employed in Title 
VII cases.”). To establish a prima facie case 
of retaliation, a plaintiff must demonstrate by 
a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) he 
engaged in a protected activity; (2) the 
employer was aware of his activity; (3) the 
employer took adverse action against him; and 
(4) a causal connection exists between the 
protected activity and the adverse action, i.e., 
that a retaliatory motive played a part in the 
adverse employment action. Sista v. CDCIxis 
N. Amer, Inc., 445 F.3d 161, 177 (2d Cir. 
2006); see also Treglia, 313 F.3d at 719. As 
stated above, the Second Circuit has 
characterized the evidence necessary for the 
plaintiff to satisfy this initial burden as 
“minimal” and “de minimis
A plaintiff may establish a causal 
connection between the protected activity and 
the adverse employment action either through 
direct evidence of retaliatory animus or by 
circumstantial evidence. See Sumner v. U.S. 
PostalServ, 899 F.2d 203, 209 (2d Cir. 1990) 
(holding that a causal connection may be 
“established indirectly with circumstantial 
evidence, for example, by showing that the 
protected activity was followed by
discriminatory treatment or through evidence 
of disparate treatment of employees who 
engaged in similar conduct or directly through 
evidence of retaliatory animus”). Where there 
is no direct evidence of retaliatory animus or 
a showing of disparate treatment of fellow 
employees who engaged in the same conduct, 
proof of causation may be shown indirectly, 
by demonstrating that the protected activity 
was followed closely by a retaliatory action. 
Gordon v. N.Y. City Bd. o f Educ., 232 F.3d 
111, 117 (2d Cir. 2000); Cifra v. Gen. Elec. 
Co., 252 F.3d 205, 217 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[T]he 
causal connection needed for proof of a 
retaliation claim ‘ can be established indirectly 
by showing that the protected activity was 
closely followed in time by the adverse 
action.’” (quoting Reed v. A.W. Lawrence & 
Co., 95 F.3d 1170, 1178 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(internal citation omitted))). Although the 
Second Circuit “has not drawn a bright line to 
define the outer limits beyond which a 
temporal relationship is too attenuated to 
establish a causal relationship between the 
exercise of a federal constitutional right and 
an al legedly re ta l i a tory act ion[ , ]” 
Gorman-Bakos v. Cornell Coop. Extension, 
252 F.3d 545, 554 (2d Cir. 2001), some 
district courts have generally concluded that 
“a passage of two months between the 
protected activity  and the adverse 
employment action seems to be the dividing 
line.” Cunningham v. Consol. Edison, Inc., 
No. 03 Civ. 3522 (CPS), 2006 WL 842914, at 
*19 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2006) (collecting 
cases). However, because the Second Circuit 
has found periods well beyond two months to 
be sufficient to suggest a causal relationship 
under certain circumstances, courts must 
carefully consider the time lapse in light of the 
entire record. See, e.g., Grant v. Bethlehem 
SteelCorp., 622 F.2d 43, 45-46 (2d Cir. 1980) 
(holding eight-month gap between EEOC 
complaint and retaliatory action suggested a 
causal relationship); see also Richardson v.
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N.Y. StateDep’to f  Corr. Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 
446-47 (2d Cir. 1999), abrogated on other 
grounds by Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. 
v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (holding abusive 
acts within one month of receipt of deposition 
notices may be retaliation for initiation of 
lawsuit more than one year earlier).
In determining whether a plaintiff has 
satisfied this initial burden, the Court’s role in 
evaluating a summary judgment request is “to 
determine only whether proffered admissible 
evidence would be sufficient to permit a 
rational finder of fact to infer a retaliatory 
motive.” Jute v. Hamilton Sunstrand Corp., 
420 F.3d 166, 173 (2d Cir. 2005). Further, as 
stated above, once a plaintiff has set forth a 
prima facie case, the burden shifts to 
defendant to show that it had a legitimate, 
non-discriminatory reason for the adverse 
employment action. Sista, 445 F.3d at 169. If 
such a showing is made, the burden shifts 
back to plaintiff to prove that the proffered 
reason is merely a pretext for unlawful 
discrimination. Id.
2. Application
Plaintiff argues that defendant retaliated 
against her for complaining about Ms. Lin’s 
conduct. Specifically, plaintiff points to the 
complaint she filed objecting to her January 
2006 performance evaluation (Pl.’s Ex. L, 
Review Response filed by Christiane 
McCowan), and her email to Mr. Panarelli on 
March 1, 2006, notifying Mr. Panarelli of her 
intention to file a “formal” harassment 
complaint against Ms. Lin. (Pl.’s Ex. Z, 
Email from Christiane McCowan to Philip 
Panarelli, Mar. 1, 2006.) On March 23, 2006, 
plaintiff emailed Javier Evans regarding Ms. 
Lin’s behavior. (Pl.’s Ex. FF, Email from 
Christiane McCowan to Javier Evans, Mar. 
23, 2006.) In those emails, plaintiff stated 
that she felt that Ms. Lin had been harassing
her since February 2004. (Id.) On April 3, 
2006, Ms. Lin emailed Mr. Panarelli, stating 
that Chris McCowan intends to file a lawsuit 
against her and asking how she should interact 
with plaintiff going forward and whether she 
should continue to manage plaintiff. (Pl.’s 
Ex. DD, Email from Michelle Lin to Philip 
Panarelli, Apr. 3, 2006.) Plaintiff’ s
employment at HSBC was terminated on 
April 11, 2006. Plaintiff alleges that the 
temporal proximity between her March 2006 
complaints about Ms. Lin and her subsequent 
termination “gives rise to a strong inference 
that she was terminated in retaliation for her 
complaints against Lin for harassment and 
discrimination based on her disability.” (Pl.’s 
Opp. at 27.)
Defendant does not contest, for purposes 
of the motion, that plaintiff participated in 
protected activity of which her supervisors 
were aware or that plaintiff suffered an 
adverse employment action, specifically, 
termination. Defendant argues, however, that 
plaintiff cannot establish a causal connection 
between her complaints regarding her review 
and Ms. Lin to Mr. Panarelli and the decision 
to terminate plaintiff. According to 
defendant, there was an intervening 
independent event that led to plaintiff’s 
t e r m i n a t i o n  — n a m e l y ,  p l a i n t i f f ’ s 
insubordination on April 11— and, therefore, 
summary judgment is warranted. 
Specifically, defendant argues that there was 
not temporal proximity between plaintiff’s 
protected activity and the adverse action, 
because several months elapsed between the 
protected activity and plaintiff’ s termination. 
According to defendant, plaintiff first 
complained about Ms. Lin’s conduct toward 
her on September 13, 2005. (Panarelli Dec. ^ 
4 (“In September 2005, I received two e-mails 
from plaintiff in which she again stated that 
she believed Ms. Lin was treating her unfairly 
and stated for the first time to me that she
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thought Ms. Lin’s treatment of her might 
possibly be because of her age and for having 
been on disability leave.”).) Thus, according 
to defendant, the temporal proximity between 
plaintiff’ s complaints and her termination is 
too great to establish a causal connection.
Having reviewed the record, and 
construing the evidence most favorably to 
plaintiff, the Court concludes that plaintiff has 
put forth sufficient circumstantial evidence of 
a causal connection between her complaints 
about Ms. Lin and the alleged adverse action 
to survive summary judgment on the 
retaliation claim. In particular, plaintiff 
expressed her intention to file a formal 
complaint against Ms. Lin less than two 
months before she was terminated. Although 
defendant points to prior complaints by 
plaintiff regarding Ms. Lin’s treatment of her, 
the earliest complaint was only eight months 
prior to plaintiff’ s termination. As a threshold 
matter, the Second Circuit has found periods 
of eight months or longer to be sufficient to 
suggest a causal relationship for purposes of a 
retaliation claim, when combined with other 
evidence. See Grant, 622 F.2d at 45-46; 
Richardson, 180 F.3d at 446-47. In any event, 
it was less than two months prior to her 
termination that plaintiff threatened a formal 
complaint or lawsuit against Ms. Lin. 
Viewing these facts in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff and drawing all 
reasonable inferences therefrom, the Court 
declines to rule that no reasonable jury could 
determine that plaintiff’s protected activity 
and the ensuing act of alleged discrimination 
were not causally connected. Based upon the 
timing of the termination in connection with 
the protected activity and the other evidence 
discussed supra with respect to the 
discrimination claims, plaintiff has created 
genuine issues of fact regarding whether 
defendant’s proffered reason for plaintiff’s 
termination was a mere pretext and whether a
retaliatory motive played a role in the adverse 
employment action. Thus, summary judgment 
on this issue is unwarranted.
C. Hostile Work Environment Claim
Plaintiff also has brought a disability- 
based hostile work environment claim. 
Defendant argues that it is entitled to 
summary judgment on the hostile work 
environment claim because plaintiff has failed 
adduce sufficient evidence to survive 
summary judgment. As set forth below, the 
Court disagrees.
1. Legal Standard
A hostile work environment, in violation 
of Title VII, is established by a plaintiff 
showing that his or her workplace was 
“permeated with ‘discriminatory intimidation, 
ridicule, and insult . . . that is sufficiently 
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of 
the victim’s employment and create an 
abusive working environment.”’ Howley v. 
Town o f Stratford, 217 F.3d 141, 153 (2d Cir. 
2000) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 
510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)); see also Terry v. 
Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 147 (2d Cir. 2003). 
“Isolated instances of harassment ordinarily 
do not rise to this level.” Cruz v. Coach 
Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 570 (2d Cir. 2000); 
see also Faragher v. City o f Boca Raton, 524 
U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (holding that “simple 
teasing . . . , offhand comments, and isolated 
incidents (unless extremely serious)” will not 
amount to discriminatory changes in the 
“terms and conditions of employment”) 
(internal citations and quotations omitted); 
Brennan v. Metro. Opera A ss’n, Inc., 192 
F.3d 310, 318 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that 
“[i]solated, minor acts or occasional episodes 
do not warrant relief’); Williams v. County o f 
Westchester, 171 F.3d 98, 100-01 (2d Cir. 
1999) (holding that “to meet his burden, the
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plaintiff must show more than a few isolated 
incidents” and “evidence solely of sporadic” 
discrimination does not suffice (internal 
quotations omitted)); Knight v. City o f N.Y., 
303 F. Supp. 2d 485, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 
(denying hostile work environment claim 
where incidents were “too remote”); Ruggieri 
v. Harrington, 146 F. Supp. 2d 202, 217-18 
(E.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that a “collection of 
administrative mixups, minor annoyances, and 
perceived slights cannot be considered severe 
or pervasive harassment”); Francis v. Chem. 
Banking Corp., 62 F. Supp. 2d 948, 959 
(E.D.N.Y. 1999) (dismissing hostile work 
environment claim where plaintiff only 
alleged four incidents).
The conduct in question must be “severe 
or pervasive enough to create an objectively 
hostile or abusive work environment, and the 
victim must also subjectively perceive that 
environment to be abusive.” Feingoldv. New 
York, 366 F.3d 138, 150 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(citation and quotation omitted). Other 
factors to consider include “the frequency of 
the discriminatory conduct; its severity; 
whether it is physically threatening or 
humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; 
and whether it unreasonably interferes with an 
employee’s work performance.” Terry, 336 
F.3d at 148 (quotation and citation omitted). 
The Second Circuit has noted, however, that 
“[w]hile the standard for establishing a hostile 
work environment is high, . . . [t]he 
environment need not be ‘unendurable’ or 
‘intolerable.’” Id. (quoting Whidbee v. 
Garzarelli Food Specialties, Inc., 223 F.3d 
62, 70 (2d Cir. 2000)). Moreover, although a 
hostile work environment generally consists 
of “continuous and concerted” conduct, “a 
single act can create a hostile work 
environment if it in fact work[s] a 
transformation of the plaintiff’ s workplace.” 
Feingold, 366 F.3d at 150 (quotations and 
citation marks omitted) (alteration in original).
Further, to succeed on a hostile work 
environment claim in the instant case, plaintiff 
must link the actions by defendants to her 
disability. Although “ [fjacially neutral 
incidents may be included, of course, among 
the ‘totality of the circumstances’ that courts 
consider in any hostile work environment 
claim,” plaintiff nevertheless must offer some 
evidence from which a reasonable jury could 
infer that the facially neutral incidents were in 
fact discriminatory. Alfano v. Costello, 294 
F.3d 365, 378 (2d Cir. 2002); see also Nakis 
v. Potter, No. 01-CV-10047 (HBP), 2004 WL 
2903718, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2004) 
(holding that “ [h]ostility or unfairness in the 
workplace that is not the result of 
di scr iminat ion against  a protected 
characteristic is simply not actionable” under 
Title VII (citing Brennan, 192 F.3d at 318 (“A 
plaintiff must also demonstrate that she was 
subjected to the hostility because of her 
membership in a protected class.”))).
2. Application
In the instant case, plaintiff asserts that 
c e r t a i n  r e m a r k s  r e l a t e d  to her  
disability/intelligence were made by Ms. Lin 
during her employment resulting in a hostile 
work environment. Defendant argues that 
those alleged isolated comments were not 
sufficiently severe or pervasive to survive 
summary judgment on the hostile work 
environment claim. However, plaintiff also 
relies on facially neutral incidents in support 
of her hostile work environment claim. In 
particular, plaintiff asserts, among other 
things, that Ms. Lin subjected her to the 
following disparate treatment based upon her 
disability, to which plaintiff alleges her 
coworkers were not subjected: Ms. Lin joked 
around with plaintiff’ s coworkers, but not 
with plaintiff; Ms. Lin spoke in a louder tone 
of voice when discussing plaintiff’ s mistakes 
with her than when she discussed coworkers’
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mistakes; Ms. Lin did not permit plaintiff to 
work a “flex-time” schedule when plaintiff 
asked to do so in 2003 or 2004 because 
coverage was needed for the later hours of the 
workday; Ms. Lin monitored plaintiff’ s 
perform ance more closely than the 
performance of her coworkers; Ms. Lin 
assigned plaintiff to archive files for a week at 
the start of each year; Ms. Lin sent plaintiff 
more work-related email than her co-workers 
received; plaintiff’ s conversations were 
monitored; plaintiff’ s annual review was 
given to her later than her coworkers received 
their reviews in 2003 or 2004; plaintiff was 
treated as though she had no intellectual 
ability and was incapable of performing her 
job duties; plaintiff was excluded from work- 
related and social conversation; Ms. Lin told 
her on two occasions, “You must have 
cracked”; Ms. Lin told her “You have no 
manners. If everyone acted like you, it would 
be a zoo”; Ms. Lin consistently asked plaintiff 
to explain her medical condition; plaintiff was 
subjected to excessive scrutiny at work; Ms. 
Lin would call and email plaintiff daily, 
questioning and challenging her work; Ms. 
Lin accused plaintiff of making errors that 
were in fact made by plaintiff’ s coworkers; 
Ms. Lin paced behind plaintiff’ s desk while 
she spoke on the phone to the Assistant 
District Attorney regarding her mother’s 
death; Ms. Lin alleged that plaintiff regularly 
engaged in personal phone calls when plaintiff 
did not in fact do so; plaintiff was not 
permitted to engage in social conversation 
with other coworkers, even though her 
coworkers conversed with one another on a 
regular basis; and Ms. Lin changed RSU 
lunch schedules to accommodate the team, but 
required plaintiff to take her lunch alone, 
which caused plaintiff to have trouble meeting 
her deadlines. (Pl.’s 56.1 ^ 40.) Plaintiff has 
submitted evidence that supports her claim 
that  Ms.  L i n ’s conduct— including 
questioning plaintiff’ s work (e.g., McCowan
Dep. at 71-72, 83-87) and monitoring 
plaintiff’ s phone calls (Pl.’s 56.1 ^
31)—worsened her medical condition. (Aff. 
of Diana Su at ^  5, 11, 12.)
As to the facially neutral incidents, the 
Court must determine whether there is 
circumstantial evidence or some other basis 
from which a jury could rationally infer these 
alleged incidents were based on plaintiff’ s 
disability. Having carefully reviewed the 
record in the light most favorable to plaintiff, 
the Court is unable to conclude as a matter of 
law that these facially neutral incidents should 
not be considered. Although it is not the only 
inference that can be drawn from these facts, 
these facially neutral incidents could be 
consistent with an employer who is treating an 
employee differently based upon a disability 
or a perceived disability. Moreover, when the 
facially neutral incidents are combined with 
the alleged comments, a rational jury could 
conclude, if  it found that all of these incidents 
occurred and were motivated by plaintiff’ s 
disability or perceived disability, that the 
conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive 
to alter the conditions of plaintiff’ s 
employment and create an abusive working 
environment. Thus, summary judgment on 
the hostile work environment claim is 
unwarranted.
IV. Co n c lu sio n
For the reasons set forth above, 
defendant’ s motion for summary judgment is 
granted in part and denied in part. 
Specifically, defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment with respect to plaintiff’ s claim of 
discrimination based upon an actual disability 
under the ADA is granted. The defendant’s 
motion for summary judgment on the 
remaining claims is denied.
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SO ORDERED.
JOSEPH F. BIANCO 
United States District Judge
Dated: February 12, 2010 
Central Islip, NY
* * *
Plaintiff is represented by Neil Frank, Pamela 
Jae Naples, and Peter Arcadia Romero of 
Frank & Associates, P.C., 500 Bi-County 
Boulevard, Suite 112N, Farmingdale, NY 
11735. Defendant HSBC is represented by 
James R. Grasso and Laurie S. Leonard of 
Phillips Lytle LLP, 3400 HSBC Center, 
Buffalo, NY 14203 and Meredith Leigh 
Friedman, HSBC Bank USA, National 
Association, 425 Fifth Avenue, 7th Floor, 
New York, NY 10018.
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